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Abstract  
Smart contract platforms have the potential to allow shared automatic control of energy transfer 
within networks in a replicable, secure, verifiable and trustworthy way. Here we present a general 
form of smart contract which captures the elements needed for shared control that will help 
formalise decentralisation. Two mechanisms were defined for agreement of control instructions for 
a Medium Voltage Direct Current (MVDC) link connecting two separately operated 33kV distribution 
networks. These were instantiated as smart contracts and were evaluated in terms of cost and the 
computational requirements for their execution. Real network and converter data from the ANGLE-
DC demonstration project were used to model the MVDC link. We demonstrate that using smart 
contracts to agree control instructions between different parties is feasible. The potential for shared 
control using smart contracts gives operators and regulators a way of defining and decentralising 






An energy system can be described as a collection of distinct networks, sources, sinks, their 
corresponding responsible parties, and the associated physical and information flows1,2. The 
information flows come from monitoring physical processes (e.g. voltage and current at a 
transformer) and decisions made by individual actors3. Information exchange interfaces are the 
mechanism by which information is passed between different responsible parties4. 
The complexity of energy networks is forecast to increase with higher volumes of information and 
numbers of controllable components5. When accompanied by decentralisation of responsibilities, 
this will lead to the creation of more information interfaces, or mean that more information must be 
processed at existing interfaces. An example of this, in electricity networks, is the possible 
transformation of Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) to Distribution System Operators (DSOs) 
in Great Britain (GB)6,7. As part of the transition, more localised balancing responsibility would be 
given to DNOs8,9. This would lead to a requirement for more complex agreements at interfaces (e.g. 
between two distribution networks or between a distribution network and a transmission network) 
as neighbouring parties will rely more on the predictable behaviour of adjacent networks10. This 
leads us to ask what standardised rulesets at the interfaces between responsible parties, if any, 
would make the operation and planning of energy systems more secure and lower cost. 
The emergence of smart contract platforms (often under the rubric of Distributed Ledger 
Technology11 or Blockchain Technology12), brings the opportunity to securely automate many of the 
procedures that take place at interfaces and potentially to lower the whole system cost11. The 
concept of smart contracts, self-enforcing agreements in the form of executable programs13, 
originating with Szabo in 199414, provides a means of setting out negotiation and self-enforcing 
settlement rules that operate with a high degree of trust. They are replicable, secure and 
verifiable15–18. A simple smart contract rule might be “if X happens, pay Y to account Z.” A crucial 
innovation is the self-enforcing nature of the “pay” statement. In the example, “X” is a digitally 
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encoded event derived from a sensor reading. Therefore the trustworthiness of any smart contract 
scheme is ultimately dependent on the trustworthiness of sensors, and the encoding and 
transmission of information. Furthermore, the position of smart contracts within existing legal 
systems is the subject of active research and consideration19–21.  Smart contracts are well suited to 
enact agreements for shared control of energy transfer processes, where the decision makers are 
located within different organisations (or sub-divisions of the same organisation). 
Examples of shared energy transfer processes in electricity networks include control of elements 
such as; switches, transformer tap changers, or power electronic converters forming a DC-link.  DC-
links allow the precise control of energy flows between electricity circuits and, combined with smart 
contracts, offer the potential to clearly delineate responsibility for the operation and control of 
distinct segments of electricity networks. The potential for DC-links to reduce network costs, 
through control of active and reactive power set-points is well documented25–31. DC-links also have 
the potential to decouple networks, and therefore clearly define responsibility for system frequency 
and, by extension, system stability26,32,33. In a GB context, this would allow the DNO to DSO transition 
to occur at increased granularity, separated by voltage level and DC links. The use of smart contracts, 
to share control of DC-links or similar elements, therefore has the potential to limit unforeseen 
complex control interactions between energy systems. Furthermore, due to the self-enforcing 
nature of smart contracts, agreed rules for shared control can be instantiated in a way that is less 
susceptible to tampering and less reliant on traditional methods for pursuit of transgressions.  
Alternatives such as control solely using sensor measurements22,23, or single-party control using a 
Distribution Management System (DMS)23,24, are prone to manipulation by one or more participants. 
The motivation behind this work is to establish how system operators, and other participants, should 
conceptualise the application of smart contracts within energy systems. In doing this, consideration 
must to given to the common characteristics such smart contracts have as well as how participants 
interact with them. In general, when two or more energy systems, with different responsible parties, 
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are connected by the same controllable process, the question of what control set-point should be 
selected in any situation is raised. Therefore, the particular research questions we address are, what 
general form could smart contract based shared control agreements take, and can example smart 
contract rules for shared control of an energy transfer process, a DC-link, be defined and 
demonstrated. 
Here we set out a general form of smart contract for shared control of energy transfer processes, 
applicable at any scale of energy system with digital monitoring and control. The general form 
consists of 6 stages; deposit, setting of preferences, negotiation, instruction of process, settlement, 
and withdrawal. We instantiate the general form contract using two defined rulesets for the shared 
control of a modelled MVDC link and, through demonstration using an emulated smart contract 
platform, we show that that using smart contracts to agree control instructions between different 
parties is feasible.  
A general form of smart contract for shared control 
The proposed general form of smart contract for negotiation and settlement of controllable 
processes between two or more responsible parties is shown in Figure 1.  We categorise information 
flows within the responsible parties in 3 layers; data processing, decision support, and decision 
making. The data processing layer is the interface with physical equipment (e.g. metering) and 
procedures (e.g. maintenance schedules). It includes collection, compression and storage of data. 
The decision support layer includes the presentation of information to decision makers after analysis 
of available data. An example is cost minimising optimisation. The decision making layer is where the 
decisions in relation to a controllable process are made. We define agreement interfaces as the 
locations where a decision maker in one responsible party must come to an agreement with a 
decision maker in another responsible party.  
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The presented conceptual framework builds on the Smart Grid Architecture Model’s (SGAM) 
definition of interoperability34. In the SGAM, interoperability is defined as the exchange of 
information between two or more systems to cooperatively perform a specific function. In our 
framework, the information exchange and the control function are integrated by a smart contract 
that instructs a physical process. The proposed framework defines a general form smart contract to 
perform the shared control function. It also categorises the information collection and analysis that 
leads to the presentation of information to the shared control smart contract. 
Model, negotiation rules and scenarios 
Here we instantiate the general form smart contract using the example of an MVDC link connecting 
neighbouring electricity networks with different responsible parties. Shared control of the active 
power setting is achieved using smart contract based negotiation. We use real network and 
converter data, and deploy a smart contract running on an Ethereum35,36 Virtual Machine (EVM), to 
form an overall model (Fig. 2).  
MVDC links are only beginning to be used37,38, so our data was sourced from a demonstration 
project, the ANGLE-DC project, where an MVDC link will connect the Isle of Anglesey to mainland 
North Wales39–41. The proposed link will operate at ±27kV DC and connect two 33kV AC networks, 
with converter ratings of 30MVA. Presently, the island network has a large amount of embedded 
generation; three wind farms with a total capacity of 34.7MW, and two solar farms with a total 
capacity of 28.5MW. Both of the 33kV AC networks are under the jurisdiction of a single responsible 
party, but we model two separate responsible parties, designated Network 1 and Network 2. 
To demonstrate how separate parties can achieve shared control of the MVDC link, both of the 
electricity networks were first modelled using a Newton Raphson based load flow method for three 
scenarios; normal (N), high demand (D), and high generation (G), see Figure 2. A simplified 
operational cost model, based on resistive losses, line utilisation and extent of deviation from 
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nominal voltage, was used to model the costs incurred by each network operator across a range of 
possible MVDC-link active power set-points. These modelled costs were used as the basis for 
choosing the input preferences to a smart contract.  
The problem, of defining the negotiation rules for the MVDC link’s active power set-point, is 
formulated as two questions; what rules should be used to select one of a range of set-points and 
how the network operators should express their preferences for each of the possible set-points. To 
do this, the MVDC-link’s active power operating range is divided into 13 options, formed by twelve 
5MW wide bins and a 0MW option. Two methods for expression of the set-point preferences are 
used. The first has the network operator submit offers (bids) for each of the options. The second 
requires the network operators to rank the options in order from most favourable, to least. As a 
result, two rulesets are created for negotiation of the MVDC link’s active power set-point; “Highest 
Combined Offer” (HCO) and “Ranked Preference Selection” (RPS). The intention behind HCO was to 
approximate the optimal set point for the ensemble of the two networks (assuming both networks 
have complete cost information for each prospective set-point and bid rationally). In contrast the 
intention behind RPS was to find a trade-off set point where the two networks have equal 
negotiation weight. 
The HCO smart contract accepts offers (bids) for each option, sums the offers from both networks 
for each option, and selects the option with the highest combined offer. The highest bidder for the 
selected option pays the lowest bidder the difference between the bids for the selected option.  The 
highest bidder then chooses the final operating point within the selected bin (submitted prior to 
negotiation). In the case that two bins receive the same highest combined offer, one of the networks 
is given authority to select the operating point. This selection authority alternates between the 
networks every time it is used. 
The RPS smart contract accepts a ranked preference list from 1 to 13 (1 is most favourable, 13 least) 
from both parties, pairs the preferences, and selects the pairs such that there are no other pairs in 
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which both parties have more favourable options. Where this results in more than one pair, one of 
the networks is given authority to select the operating point. This selection authority alternates 
between the networks every time it is used. The two algorithms are compared in Figure 3 and they 
are formally specified in the Methods section. 
The inputs to the contracts, shown in Figures 4 and 5, are calculated based on a comparison of the 
operating costs at each DC-link power set point for 48 half hour periods for the three scenarios (N, D 
and G). The modelled network operation costs are translated into offers (in the case of HCO) or 
preference rankings (in the case of RPS). These are shown as heat maps in Figures 4 and 5, with each 
network’s preferred operating point represented by the red lines. Using these data, the smart 
contracts were tested with the nine combinations of network loadings (N-N, N-D, N-G, D-N, D-D, D-
G, G-N, G-D and G-G). 
Smart contract execution 
The HCO and RPS smart contracts were written in the Solidity smart contract language, for execution 
on an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). A deposit function was included and two deposit accounts 
were maintained. In the case of the HCO contract, the deposit amounts were adjusted based on the 
payment requirements (the difference between the offers at the selected operating point). The 
testing environment utilised is shown in Figure 6. It includes an emulated Ethereum blockchain 
created with TestRPC. This was interfaced using Python42,43 with Numerical Python44, Pandas45, 
Matplotlib46 and Web3.py.  
The computational cost of running the contract on the public Ethereum smart contract platform was 
calculated as a proportion of the present limit47. The HCO contract would use 0.15% of the total half 
hourly capacity and the RPS ruleset would use 0.09%. There is scope for optimisation of our smart 
contract code, and the pre-input data submission formats. Therefore, in practice, a lower cost of 
computation could be expected. It is well known, however, that blockchain implementations 
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sometimes have relatively high transaction costs. The example was of steady state control of a 
discrete element within a power system. It is therefore possible to create multiple instances (e.g. for 
different DC-links) across different platforms, allowing the parties to select the smart contract 
platform based on transaction, running, or implementation costs. Furthermore, a default operating 
point selection could be added to the smart contract negotiation rules, for the case where 
transaction costs exceed an agreed threshold. 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess how varying the number of possible set-point options 
affects the computational cost, see Figure 7. It was found that the computational cost of the HCO 
algorithm scales linearly with the number of bins. In contrast, the RPS contract’s computational cost 
scales exponentially with the number of bins. This is likely to be due to the nested for loops within 
the RPS implementation. When the number of bins is lower than or equal to 43, the computational 
cost of the HCO contract is higher than the RPS contract.  
The scaling of computational cost with negotiation frequency is more straightforward. Each 
negotiation and settlement period requires two transactions (instructions to run the smart contract 
code, paid for by the originator), one from each network operator. Increasing the rate of set-point 
negotiations therefore requires a further two transactions for each additional negotiation period. It 
might be expected that decreasing the bin width and the negotiation period would result in lower 
network costs due to increased precision in mapping of costs to prospective operating points. In 
practical application, a cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken to estimate the optimum bin-
width and negotiation frequency. 
Performance of the smart contract negotiation algorithms 
Figure 8 shows the active power set-points selected by the HCO and RPS contracts for each of the 
network loading scenarios (N, D, G).  Figure 9 shows the total modelled cost saving across both 
networks with the smart contract algorithms, relative to the situation with no DC-link installed. Note 
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that this does not include the computation cost of running the smart contract and the operational 
cost model does not reflect the true whole system cost. To achieve a whole system cost evaluation, 
an exogenous model evaluation and validation would need to be conducted that establishes the 
validity of the whole system model and its cost data. However, our simplified model is suffice to 
establish the principle of shared control through smart contracts and to compare the performance 
of the two presented algorithms. 
In comparing the HCO and RPS rulesets, we observe that the HCO contract always selects the active 
power settings with the lowest total modelled operational costs for the networks. In contrast, the 
RPS contract often deviates from the lowest total modelled cost, especially where the preferences 
are different, such as the case when Network 1 has high loading. This is reflected in the 
disagreement in selected operating points in Figure 8 and is particularly noticeable when Network 1 
experiences high loading (central column in Figure 8).  
The benefit from reducing the total modelled costs of the two networks was not evenly shared. With 
the HCO contract, Network 1 would incur a relatively large cost for a non-preferred operating point, 
therefore it puts in relatively high bids to avoid the possible selection of the non-preferred option.  
This means that it always pays the less sensitive network (Network 2). Consequently, in the test 
scenarios, Network 1 often has higher modelled costs than if no DC-link were installed (with its 
counterpart, Network 2, being the beneficiary of the reduction in the total modelled operational 
costs). We suggest that, in practice, Network 1 would assess that the risk, of its neighbour making a 
competitive offer for its preferred operating point, is low, and that it could therefore reduce its 
offers significantly. In contrast to the HCO ruleset, the RPS ruleset gives equal weighting to the 
preferences of both network operators. No payment is made between the parties. Therefore, whilst 
both networks have lower modelled costs than in the case with no DC link, Network 2 can inflict 




We foresee a growing research field around the concept of shared control through smart contracts. 
Areas for further development include smart contract algorithm design and implementation as well 
as methods and techniques for integration with control and metering hardware. Here, shared 
control of a power electronic based DC-link was chosen as the control element, but the presented 
algorithms could also be applied to AC control elements with direct control over the active power 
settings. Furthermore, the general approach could be used to share control of any element that has 
influence over two or more networks with different responsible parties; transformer tap changers, 
for example. The approach could also be applied where there are more than two parties (n>2). A 
realistic case would be multi-terminal DC-links located at the intersection of three or more distinct 
networks.  
Further analysis, including with the network operators adopting co-operative, adversarial and 
indifferent strategies (for the input of preferences to the shared control smart contract) should be 
undertaken. This analysis must also account for the operation of the physical networks. For instance, 
if one network operator does not like the selected MVDC link operating point, what stops it from 
isolating the busbar and making power transfer impossible? This could be solved through inclusion 
of a meter-linked penalty function in the smart contract. For example, if one network does not allow 
power transfer this would be detected at the DC link and a pre-agreed penalty fee automatically 
transferred.  
The two presented smart contract algorithms have been shown to function. In the presented 
arrangement, each network operator has incentive to ensure that their preferences reflect the 
constraints of their network. With the HCO algorithm for example, this would result in relatively high 
bids for set-points that do not cause constraints to be exceeded. If an undesirable set-point (e.g. one 
that would, without intervention, result in a costly voltage excursion) did get selected (through the 
other operator bidding highly for it), then it would be the duty of the first network operator to 
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accommodate the selected setting. In our example, the cost of this is simulated using a simplified 
electricity network operation cost model. A potentially beneficial effect of the arrangement is to 
increase the incentive for the network operators to accurately predict their prospective costs and to 
map them to the prospective shared control set-points.  This should result in responsible parties 
seeking things that improve the predictability of their network (e.g. active network management, 
advanced prediction software, energy storage, co-operative relationships with neighbours) and, 
ultimately, lead to a more resilient system.  
Regulatory or system governance intervention will likely be required to make use of smart contracts 
for shared control of interconnecting processes, such as the DC-link example presented here. In our 
example, Network 1 sometimes had higher costs than it would have had with no DC-link (with 
Network 2 being the beneficiary). Whilst, in practice, this may result in one network reducing its 
offers over time, it may also dissuade network operators from creating such links (despite the 
potential for overall operational cost reduction) in the first place. Therefore, given energy networks 
are natural monopolies, regulatory intervention may be required to stimulate the interconnection of 
networks in the way set out here.  
We conclude that smart contract based shared control of energy infrastructure is feasible. The 
general conceptual framework that was presented captures the elements needed in smart contracts 
for shared control. The work demonstrates two algorithms for smart contract based shared control 
of DC-link active power between two electricity networks. The conceptual framework, and the 
demonstrated operation with a DC-link example, show a way to share control of energy network 
assets and establish a means for system operators, and other participants, to conceptualise the 
application of smart contracts within energy systems. The use of smart contracts for shared control 





Selection based on the highest combined offer  
In this ruleset, both the network operators are required to submit offers for each active power set-
point bin for a given time window. The offers are in monetary units, denoted as 
 , ,{ | 1,2,...,| |} ,i t i t
b
O b i t    O B I T , (1) 
where O  represents an offer and O  is the set of offers; i  is the index of a network operator, and I  
is the set of all the participating network operators (in this paper = 2| I | ); t  is the index of a time 
window, and T  is the set of all the time windows considered; b  is the index of the active power set-
point bin, and B  is the set of all the bins. The network operators are free to make any offer for any 
bin, provided that adequate deposit has been made.  
Once the offers have been received, the bin with the highest summed offer is selected, i.e. 








where *b  represents the set-point bin finally selected. The consideration behind this design is to 
maximize the overall benefits of interconnected networks. *b  is found using the following 
algorithm:  
 
Algorithm 1: Selection based on the highest combined offer (HCO) 
 
INPUT: ,i tO , B  





1: max 0c   // maxc  stores the maximum value of the summed offers 
2: for 1 | |b to B do 
3:  1, 2,t t
b b
c O O   // c  is a temporary variable to store the summed offers at a setpoint bin 
4:  if maxc c  do 
5:   maxc c  
6:   *b b  
7:  end if 
8: end for 




After *b  is selected, the network operator with the higher offer at *b  is required to pay the other 
network operator the difference of the offers at *b , and gets the right to decide the exact operating 
point within the bin, i.e. to instruct the DC link controller during operation. Finally, note that the 
network operators are free to pick the reactive power operating points, as long as they are within 
converter constraints. 
Ranked Preference Selection  
In this ruleset, each network operator is required to submit a preference list for active power set-
point bins for a given time window. The list consists of ordered preferences, denoted as 
 , ,{ | 1,2,...,| |} ,i t i tbP b i t    P B I T , (3) 
where ,i tbP  represents the preference of the network operator i  for the set-point bin b  for the time 




Once the preference lists have been received, the preferences for each bin are paired (e.g. 1,tbP  and 
2,t
b
P  are paired as < 1,tbP , 
2,t
b
P >). Then the Pareto subset of all the pairs, consisting of all the non-
dominated pairs, is identified, and the bins corresponding to the elements of the Pareto set are 
taken as the candidates for the final set-point bin. The consideration behind this design is that the 
preferences of both the network operators are equally important, so only the undesirable bins, 
where there exists a possible set-point that is preferable (more highly ranked in their preference list) 
to both network operators, are ruled out. Formally, the candidate bins, denoted as , are the 
solutions (i.e. Pareto optima) of a two-objective optimization problem: 
 























where 1( )f b  and 2 ( )f b  are the two objectives, i.e. the mapping between the set-point bins and 
preferences. 
*
b  is determined by comparing each pair of preferences, < 1,tbP , 
2,t
b
P >, with all the others; if the pair 
is lower ranked than some other pair for both the operators, it is dominated and should be ruled 
out. In contrast, if the pair is not lower ranked than any other pair for both the operators, it is a non-








P , B  







1: for 1 | |b to B do 
2:  0s   // s  is a flag indicating whether the bin b  is dominated: “1” for dominated; “0” for non-dominated 
3:  for ' 1 | { }|b to b \B do 
4:   if 
1, 1, 2, 2,
' '
&t t t t
b b b b
P P P P   do // &  represents the logical operator “and” 
5:    1s   
6:    break // Exit the current “for” loop 
7:   end if 
8:  end for 
9:  if 0s   do 
10:   * bb  //   is the operator that puts the right-side element into the left-side array 
11:  end if 
12: end for 




If the candidate setpoint bin, *b , includes only one element, then the sole element is naturally the 
final set-point bin; but if *b  includes multiple elements, the final set-point bin is selected by one of 
the networks. The authority to make this final selection alternates between the networks every time 
it is used. It may be preferable to select the final set point through random selection from the Pareto 
optimal set, as opposed to alternating selection authority. However, due to the relative expense of 
random number generation using smart contracts, this was not used.  Finally, both the operators are 
free to pick the reactive power operating points, within converter constraints. 
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Simplified model of Network Operator costs 
The MVDC link was modelled using a steady state approach. The two networks were modelled using 
a fast-decoupled Newton Raphson based load flow method (IPSA software was used), the network 
models have been described in prior work37. This was then used to calculate cost of operation for 
each of the networks at each active power set-point. These costs were then converted into offers, or 
ordered preferences, for use as inputs for the smart contracts. 
MVDC link model 
Voltage control mode was selected for the MVDC link. This allows the active power of the MVDC link 
to be determined by instruction from the smart contract and for the reactive power at both 
terminals to be automatically adjusted (e.g. at the tertiary control level) to maintain the voltage at a 
specified value, 1 p.u. A mathematical model of the MVDC link was developed by considering the 
constraints of the VSCs: 
Active power constraints: 
𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶1 + 𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶2 + 𝑃𝐷𝐶−𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 0                                                                                                                     (5) 
where 𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶1 and 𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶2 are the active power flow through each VSC. 𝑃𝐷𝐶−𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is the loss within the 
DC link, which is relatively low (approximately 1 ~ 2% of the active power flowing through the DC 
link) compared to the total losses within the network. Therefore, 𝑃𝐷𝐶−𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 is neglected, and Equation 
(5) is simplified as: 
𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶1 = −𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶2                                                                                                                                           (6) 
Reactive power constraints: 
The reactive power is considered as it influences the modelled operational cost of the networks. 
After the active power set-point has been selected by the smart contract, each network operator is 
able to select the reactive power, within the capacity constraints of its connected converter. The 




𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛 ≤ 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥    (𝑛 = 1,2)                                                                                                         (7) 
where 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛 is the reactive power at 𝑛
𝑡ℎ terminal of the DC link. 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛  and 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥  are the lower 
and upper limits of reactive power provided by the VSC at terminal 𝑛, the modelled MVDC link is two 
terminal so 𝑛 is no greater than 2. 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is positive, indicating that reactive power is injected to the 
network, and 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛  is negative, indicating that reactive power is absorbed from the network. 
Capacity constraints: 
The converter capacity constraints are defined by: 
√𝑃𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
2 + 𝑄𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛
2 ≤ 𝑆𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛 (𝑛 = 1,2)                                                                                                         (8) 
where 𝑆𝑉𝑆𝐶,𝑛 is the rated capacity of the VSC at 𝑛
𝑡ℎ terminal of the DC link, the modelled MVDC link 
is two terminal so 𝑛 is no greater than 2. 
Network operation cost function 
The operational costs of the network at each end of the MVDC link include the energy losses, as well 
as the equivalent cost from overloading and voltage violations. Here, a cost to maintain a relatively 
balanced loading between branches is assigned to the line utilization index, and a cost to maintain a 
relatively consistent voltage profile (voltages close to the nominal values) is assigned to the voltage 
profile index. A weighting factor is used for each of the three elements in order to calculate the total 
cost for operating the network. As the MVDC-link active power set-points vary, the line currents and 
node voltages are affected. The voltages and currents are used within the power loss, line utilisation 
and voltage profile index calculations. 
𝑓 =  𝑓1,t × 𝑃𝑟1 × 𝑤1 + 𝑓2,t × 𝑃𝑟2 × 𝑤2 + 𝑓3,t × 𝑃𝑟3 × 𝑤3            (9) 
where  𝑓1,t is the power losses at time t, 𝑓2,t is the line utilization index, and 𝑓3,t is the voltage profile 
index. 𝑃𝑟1, 𝑃𝑟2 and 𝑃𝑟3 are the prices for power losses, loading and voltage profiles respectively 
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and 𝑤1, 𝑤2, and 𝑤3 are the weighting factors of the three elements considered. The detailed 
expression of 𝑓1, 𝑓2 and 𝑓3 are: 
𝑓1,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑘,𝑡
2 × 𝑟𝑘,𝑡 
𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ
𝑘=1                                                                              (10) 
where the active power losses in feeder lines and transformers of a network were considered. 𝐼𝑘,𝑡 is 
the current flowing through branch 𝑘. 𝑟𝑘,𝑡 is the resistance of that branch, and 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ is the total 











                                                                                                                           (11) 
where 𝐼𝑘,𝑡 is the apparent power flow in branch 𝑘 at time t, and 𝐼𝑘,𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  is the rated current of the 
branch. 𝑁𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ is the total number of branches. The line utilization index reflects the average 
degree of utilization of all feeder lines in a network, it reflects the costs associated with a network 
with limited available capacity. These costs arise from the requirement to perform costly actions 






                                                                                                                        (12) 
where the improvement of voltage profiles can be achieved by minimizing the voltage profile index. 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑉𝑖,𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑  are the real and nominal voltages at bus 𝑖. 𝑁𝑏𝑢𝑠 is the total number of buses. The 
voltage profile index reflects the mean deviation of all bus voltages from the nominal value (1 p.u.). 
Translation of modelled costs into smart contract inputs 
The modelled costs were translated into inputs for the HCO and RPS smart contracts. For the HCO 
smart contract, the offer made by a network operator for any given operating point range (bin), is 
the difference between its modelled cost for that bin and its highest modelled cost found in the 
entire range of prospective operating points. The bin with the highest modelled costs therefore has 
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an offer of zero. For the RPS smart contract, the costs for operation in each bin were ranked from 
least costly to most costly.  
Smart contract EVM computation cost  
The accumulated GAS (the unit for computational work on the EVM) was recorded for each of the 
transactions (sending the offers to the contract and instructing it to calculate the active power set 
point) and used as the measure of proportional computing cost, relative to the block GAS limit 
(presently47  8,000,000) of the public Ethereum platform. The mean computational cost for a 
transaction used with the HCO ruleset (selecting from 13 active power bins) was 19.6% of an 
individual block limit. The mean computational cost for a transaction used with the RPS ruleset was 
11.7% of the individual block limit. The contracts used 2 transactions per half hourly period, and, 
assuming a 14 second period between blocks, the HCO ruleset would use 0.15% of the total public 
Ethereum platform’s present EVM computation capacity over each half hour; the RPS ruleset would 
use 0.09%.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
To assess the scaling complexity of the HCO and RPS algorithms, the test procedure was repeated 
with increasing numbers of bins (set-point options). The total computational cost of all of the 
transactions was assessed against the number of bins. The results are shown in Figure 7. 
Code Availability 
Information about the code used in this research, including how to access it, can be found in the 
Cardiff University data catalogue at http://doi.org/10.17035/d.2018.0064088749. 
Data Availability 
The data that support the plots within this paper and other findings of this study are available from 
the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Provision of the underlying electricity network 
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data is subject to the permission of Scottish Power Energy Networks. However, the modelled power 
network cost data are provided as supplementary data, allowing the results to be recreated.  
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Figure legends 
Fig. 1 | General form of smart contract for shared control of an energy transfer process. The deposit stage requires both 
parties to prove that they have adequate currency to cover the negotiation outcome. If one party does not, then control of 
the shared process reverts to the other party. The setting of preferences includes the communication of how much each 
operating point is desired. Following this, in the negotiation stage, the contract runs a pre-agreed set of rules on the 
preferences and delivers a selected operating point. This is used to instruct the physical hardware in the instruction of 
process stage. In the settlement stage, the contract runs a set of rules to calculate any peer to peer payments, based on 
the negotiation and actual operation. Finally, the smart contract includes a means of withdrawing the deposit and, if 
included in the rules, any peer to peer payments 
Fig. 2 | Model architecture for the simulated smart contracts. The normal scenario combines the source demand data 
(red dash-dot) and generation data (green dash). The high demand scenario was created by multiplying the demand in the 
normal scenario by three. The high generation scenario was created by multiplying the generation in the normal scenario 
by three. 
Fig. 3 | A simplified example of the implemented rulesets for a given time window. The middle bin at 0MW is shown as 
5MW wide for clarity. A “zero width” bin (a single 0MW option) was actually used, bringing the converter range to ±30MW. 
The HCO algorithm selects the bin with the highest combined bid from both network operators. The RPS algorithm first 
selects the bin with the lowest summed rank from the options where there are no other ranked set-point preference pairs 
in which both parties have more favourable options. If there is more than one option in this “pre-selection” set, the final 
selection is made by the network operator with selection authority (which alternates between the operators). Brackets 
indicate the ranking of each network’s set point preferences in the RPS contract.  
Fig. 4 |Offers (bids) sent to the HCO smart contract. The y-axes indicate the prospective operating point of the MVDC-link 
(divided into bins). The x-axes indicate the time of day (half hour number). The colour indicates the size of the bid for a 
particular operating point for a given half-hour period. The colours are normalised (made proportional to the maximum 
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offer for the day). The red line is the lowest cost operation.  N, D, and G refer to the normal, high demand, and high 
generation scenarios. 
Fig. 5 | Ranked set-point preferences sent to the RPS smart contract. The y-axes indicate the prospective operating point 
of the MVDC-link (divided into bins). The x-axes indicate the time of day (half hour number). The colour indicates the 
preference order for each operating point for a given half-hour period. The colours are normalised (made proportional to 
the maximum offer for the day). The red line is the lowest cost operation.  N, D, and G refer to the normal, high demand, 
and high generation scenarios. 
Fig. 6 | Overview of smart contract development and testing tools. The modelled smart contracts were executed on the 
TestRPC based EVM. The smart contracts, written in the Solidity language, were compiled using the Remix development 
environment. Contract deployment, deposits, and the communication of network operator preferences were done with 
transactions prepared using the Web3.py client. Modelling of the electricity networks was done using IPSA.  
Fig. 7 | Scaling of computational cost against number of bins for the HCO and RPS algorithms. The total computational 
cost of all transactions across all of the tested scenarios, half-hourly negotiation, with an increasing number of set-point 
options (number of bins).  
Fig. 8 | The MVDC link operating points selected by the smart contracts. The y-axes are the selected active power setting 
of the DC-link (positive is from Network 1 to Network 2) and the x-axes are the time of day (half hour number). N, D, and G 
refer to the normal, high demand, and high generation scenarios. HCO and RPS indicate the output from the Highest 
Combined Offer and Ranked Preference Selection smart contract algorithms. “RPS pre-selection” indicates those active 
power set-points with the lowest summed rank where there are no other ranked set-point preference pairs in which both 
parties have more favourable options.  
Fig. 9 | Modelled total network operation costs with shared control (relative to the case with no DC-Link). The y-axes are 
the modelled operational cost for the selected DC-link active power as a proportion of the modelled operation cost for the 
case with no DC-link. The x-axes are the time of day (half hour number). N, D, and G refer to the normal, high demand, and 
high generation scenarios. 
 
